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l. Introduction
Is the car indnst.ry willing to introdnce more fuel-efficient. vehicles? And if not, why~? How will the car indnst.ry react if a fuel efficiency standard is imposed?
These questions have becorne the snbject of heated debate among the car indnstry and ecological orgarrizat.ions like Greenpeace. The focus is on the technological feasibility and marketability of a fnel efficient car (henceforth FEC) with a gas mileage of only 3 liters per hundred kilometers. The car industry claims that an FEC c~ould already be supplied to t.he market bnt. wonld be offered with less c~omfort. at a higher price.' Greenpeace, however, has shown that these arguments are at. best, exaggerated. Greenpeace redesigned a Renault Twingo and thereby rednced its gas consurnpt.ion from 5.6 t.o 3.2 liter, per hundred kilomet.ers withoitt.
affecting neither cornfort nor performance of the original modcl.
In t,his paper we claim that. the car industry is rehtctant to offer the FEC hecause the provision of higher firel eHiciency implies a modification of the att.ribnte mix of their models which in tnrn may deteriorate theár c~.ompetit.ive pusit.ion in t.he outpnt. market. Consider that. an improvement. of fitel efficiency can be achicved tlrrongh more aerodynamic shapes, less weight, and bet.ter performing engines.Z 'See Albert Caspers, PDG Ford, and David J. Herman, PDG Opel, in Wirtschaftswoche (1995) . Reduced comfort stems from the necessity that an FEC must be a lightweighted car. Potential buyers have to dispense with heavy equipment such as air-conditioning and~or stearing aid (Blick durch die Wirtschaft (1996) ).
2Greenpeace modified the Twingo at these three levels: first, they improved the aerodynamics by 3001o changing the rear and front of the car. Second, they reduced the total weight hy 20" 10 
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These means are linked to other prodnct attribntes such as size, styling, low noise and vibrat.ion highly valned by consnmers.3 bloreover, high fnel economy itself is also one of these desirable vehicle attributes. Its provision should therefore not be seen as an end in itself bnt as a resitlt. of a prodnct placement. decision reflect.ing t.he different trade-off's bet.ween several dependent at.tribnt.es. Hence, the FEC shoi~ld resnlt from an equilibrium attribute choice.
Our paper stiidies this argument in t.he framework of a simple t,wo-dimensional product cíifferentiation model. We consider competition between dnopolistic car prodncers whose vehicles are vertically (qnality) and horizontally (variety) differeutiated. Vertical differentiation arises from the fact that all consnmers prefer a more fnel efficient car if offered at t,he same price. Consnmers differ in their preferences for the shape (styling) of a car. For instance, some prefer a`t.ln~ee-box saloon' to a`5-door hatchback'. These differences in shape generat.e horizontal differentiation in the car market. hi eqnilibrium firms have to deternune a mix of the vertical and the horizontal ,tttribntc~,. The key chscrvation is that thcse attribntes are dependent., i.e., a]vgh fitel efíïciency can only be aclueved if the car takes on a specific aerodynamic shape. The objective is t.hen to derive t.he eqnilibrinm mix of attribittes and its comparative st.at.ic properties.
Aerocl~-namic' clrag is an important. cleterminant for fitel economy. It is a forc~e opposiug the mot.ion of a~~ehicle tltat resnlts from t.he resistanc,c~of the ambient~air to tl~tc movernent of the vehicle t.hrongh it.." According to the Nai.iona] Research Connc'il (1992) recinc~t.ions of 20Io in aerod,ynanric drag coefficients are possibly leadiug to an improvement of fnel ec'onomy of abont. 5~Io. Windtnnnel tests show chat. there only exist. c~ertain opt.inral shapes minimizing gas c~onstrmption. Hen~e, firms are forcecl to approac~,h t,heses shapes when improving fitel effit'iency tluoirgh bet.ter aerodynanucs. This clepenclency implies t,hat c~ars become more and more sitnilar whenever t.heir 6re1 efficiency rises. Therefore, the variet.y of t.he cars' exterior dec~reases.`' 'e hncl t.lrat a t.echnology constraint. affects thc willingness of c'ar producers to provide fuel efiicient. c~ars. Fnrthermore, we show t.hat car procíncers provicle too little firel efpicienay. The int.nition comes in two st.eps. First, a positive clemturcl effect~uises as increasing qnalit}~attracts c'onstrmors. This effec~t is stronger in the presence of a technology constraiut. since a higher qualit.y implies less horizontal differentiat.ion. As a resiilt demancl is more qnality c~ltt"stic in eqnilibrintn. Tlre t"Fuel economy might he increaserl hy rcdesiguing the vehiclr exterior to rerlure the aer~r dVnamic drag forces that consutne a substantial proportion of the fitel enargc at Ligó spc~ecl.," (National I2escarclt Comtcil (1092), p. 34). bíacGready (1989) computes that. the aerodynamic drag determines about ï~q~to 807 of the force to be overcome when driving a titeady state cycle at 55-65 tu.p.h.. SSimilar Trade-offs between quality chazacteristics may also be ímportant for cars: a higher weigltt increases gas consumption but improves the road-behavior of a car; expanding the glas surface means better visibility and hence safety but increases the need for airconditioning which iu turn increases weighr, thus gas consumption.
second force is strategic. Better aerodynamics imply a negative strategic effect..
Thís effect is more pronounced in t.hc presence of a t.c,~chnology constaaint since the dcrrease in horizontal differentiation renders price competit.ion fiercer thns iuclircing more aggressive price responses. Therefore, car prodncers crncíerinvest.
iu fitel efficiency in order not to induce an aggressive rc~ponse by the cornpet,it.or.
Onr compatat.ive static resnlts suggest that. wheu consumers care less abont fuel economy, that is when real gasoline pricc~s are low, the ]evel of sctpplied fnel economy is also low. This reflects t.he sitaation in t.he US where gasoline is relativcly inexpensive. The correlation bet.ween firel prices and improvements in the fuel ec:onomy of cars has been observecí by the National R.esearch Conncil Go~.ernment to introduce Corporate Average Fnel Economy (CAFE) stanctards.
A regnlator shonld also incorporate potent.ial costs chte t,o the fact. that. a c~otr-tiutuer ha.ti to btry a~-clrich~~aith othi~r attribntcs thau Lc rn' shc othcrwist~~-ottltl ha:-c~bonght. In oitr modt~l~r utinitntun fncl cconotuy' struidard iti alwa}.s bt~ucficial.
Siuce firms compE~te for the mxrgiual consumer thet' iurdt~rincctit. in qnality as this generatos au ag~ressive responsc by the cornpet.itor. Otn~resttlts also iudicate that. pendence bet.ween horizontal and~.erti~~al differentiation r~~itli an applic~atiou to banking. In his paper banks face a dis~~rets~,hoice be~twc~en a high and fi low sc~r-cice qn~lity . In contr~st, this paper allows for a oont.innons qnality choire. Canoy and Peitz (1997) support onr conje~tnre that attribi~te dependence is~tn important phenomenon for t.he analysis of market strnc~f.iire. They start. from the observ~- There ia a continnum of constnners clistrihuted over the tmit. interval ac~.c~orcling to a ntuform density fimction. Wit}tout loss of generality, we norrnalize t.he total popnlation to 1. Each consumer is characterized hy his most preferred prodnct. Obsc~r~-c~t.hat. B~0 is thc~sttmc for aIl cousnmc~rs. This c~an bc~jnstific~cl by pointing ont thar a qnality iinpro~ement means et IugLc~r rniles-per-gallon performance, hence savin~s in operational c~osts. Sine~c, rars ha~-c~a gi~-en total lifetime cnileage t.}iese savings will approximatc~h-be t.hc~5amea for eac~lt ronstnner.T his is true if~~~e abstract from the facts 1}iat the LifFtime mileage tnay be dri~-en o~.er differing rime inrPnals, or that the car ma} be sold hefrire the Iife~tim~miloa{;e Ita. been reac~he~d. [n the next sa~tion we stndy how firms determine the level of fnel~~orLSiunption in n symmetri~~equilibrinm. The partic~nlrtirity of this cle~~isiou is that a low level oF fiiel consumption t`c2n only be provided if the automobiles appronrh a spcY~ificã Prodaction is sttc~h tttat t.he 1c~-el of yu~ilit,y-does nor affer~t~~ariahlc~r.r~st5~r}ti~~lt
tObser~e that the size oE~also determines thn le~rl of g~s cousumption that can be reachrd cia aerod~namic optimization. Indeed, if w is high an improvement in the aerodynarnics is uot ã er}~efficient de~ice to reduce fuel consumption. Thua, the size of -~differs for different segmenis of ttte car rnarket. lifferentiation.'~It dcepends on the interaction parameter~~~5 well~s on thc~T he first term of (3.1) cau actuallv be w.rittc~n~s ,~(2 t B t A)~3 whereas the first term of pro~~idcd quality le~-els. The second component shows the picre effec~t of~.c~rtiral clifferentiation. It is the more prononnc~ed thc~higher the c~onsnmers'~c-illingness to pay for a ynality improvement, and the more prodnc~ts are differentiated with respe~t. to qnalit.v.
Second, a5 expectcd we have
Hence, priee c~ompetit.ion becomes tongher as ry inc~rcases. For a given level of qiialit.y firms locations ari the line move closer t.lnis intensifying price~ompetition along the variet.al oharact.erist.ic. Accordingly, at t.he price eqnilibrium demand fimr~tions become more price elastic.
Third. unlike standard models of qnality c~hoi~e a qiiality improvement. of one's prodnc~t does not uec~essarily allow for a higher price in equilibrinm. In fact, we
The reason is t.he following. It is easv to show that. for a11 admissible~-aluc~~~nf an increase in s, shifts firm i's best. reply ontward. This allows for a higher p, in spit.e of the fact that firm j's best reply shifts inwards as s, angments as long as Fnrtherrnore, the pro~.ivion of ynality retltrires that the t~onsitmers marbinal u.il]-iugnesti to pay for qttnlit~. is snffit~ic~ntly-hi~;h. i.e. B 7 ry~2.tt~~o rice rhat the lattrr i, ahcays satisfied in our model since the notiott of qualit}' implies that B~-.. The second ra~e~~.here no qualit}~is taro~.ided is the on~~where r is sn hi~h that firtus would make lusses at an~.~~0.
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d1 --~( 3c~-2ryZ)z c 0.
i.r,., tlie eqnilibrinm quality nneqnivocally falls as ry increa5es. The intiiition r~omes from t.6e first order~~ondition of the qnality game, which is d~r,(s,, s~)~D~D; dpi -P, '~~-cs~-0, l,7 -f1, B; i~7 (3.5) rls, r7s; c7p~ds
E~.~~lnation of p, tit the ser,oiid stt~ge eqiiilibriimt~tind nsitig the fact. thttit.
ciD,~íJp, f ciD,~137;~-0 alloti-s ns to re~critr~( 3.i) as
d~~-~-C.tir.
I7, -crm.st.
I1.5'r (3.G)
wtiE~re t.he first terni in sqii~rc brir.kcts rrre:~.5nriw hy lrow mncó firm i r.~~rr it~~rt~~~.5e its pricc in r~sponae to a m~rKinril increase in qnality while keepinR its dernrinrl t~onstant. The s~'ond term is the ri~-11's price rear~tion to snch~i marginal int~re~se.
Intnitively, changes in s,~nd 7;, c~an only be "demand nentral" if they Icave t.lif~position of the marginal coiisiimer iinaffected. Henr'e, in eynilibriiim tlie first term miLSt be siich that. it, Ieaveti the indirect iitilitr of t.he marginal~~onsiimer nnt~hviged. Since a symmetrir~equilibrium reynires a 50 : 50 split of dein~.nd we have~-1~2 and obtain the value of dp,~ds,~o -i~z from t.otally differentiat.ing Qiialit}-iti an aggretitii~~c~~lc~c~i5ion variable siuce the ri~~al reac~ts to a mar~inal iuc~rc~~se~ti-it.h~ti pric~c rednc~t.ion. I3is reac~tion is st.ron~er thc higlx.r ry, i.c~., tLct rnigher pric~c~competit-ion is. Overall. it is c~.~tiily seen that th~negati~~e cffc~c~t an inc~rease in~h~us on tLe strate~;ic~term morc~tlcxn oiitwc~it;lis an~-hositi~~e imliac~t it r:w h~ti~-c~nn tli~martiin;cl c-onsnrnor's mnr~inal willingn~tis to ha~.. Tlnis. snrli an inc~r~~~Gticr rc~dnres hhe LHS of (3.6) whiclc establishes the c~omparxt.i~~o st.atic~resiclt. titatc~cl in (3.~1).
Eqiiilibrinm prices are eqiial to the liorizontll distrui~~c~of firm5. Prodiu~ts arel iomogencons w-ith reshect to qnality-so that t.he~lat.ter has no clirect effec.t. oñ~O
bse~.e rhat y(y) -ti.~is a hyperbola~,-ith ar~ruaxi -1~4.~~s Of aiurse. insertion oE (3.7) and (3.ti) in (3.G) g9ves c"~of protiosition 1. lti pricc~s. However, dne to tho technological const.raint prices depend indirectly oñ~n ality. Since a higher qualit,y implies less horizontal differentiation prices fall as qnalitv increases. hi particnlar nnlike what. is nsnally foimd eqnilibrinm prices f.~ll in thc consnrners' tnarginal wíllingness to pay for qnalit.y, i.e.
Obncrve fitrthermori, th~tit dPn~.
d8~0
.
The sign of dpn`~dry depends on B and c. It. is easily~rrified that.
dpn`-3c f 3c(8B f 3c) d~c0iffycy-~ĩ .e., when c and B are high the equilibrinm price is likely t.o fall in }~. Tliis is the resnlt of two opposing effects, i.e. dp,,~~pr~~.
as ,i7 s-sn~c -~c -F irst.. there is a direct price competition effect which is negative. Leaving quality imchanged, an increase in y decreases horizont.al differentiation on the line. Price t~omperition is more int.ettse thns p"~mnst fall. Sec~ond, there is an indirE.~~t effec~t since firrns adapt s"~`to changc~s in 7. From eqnation (3.4) we know that thc eqnilibriimr qnality falls in ry. Hence, the distance between hhe goods augments and prit.es~~an rise.14 4. Optimal Quality Standard
In this snbsection, we disc:nss t.he behavior of a regnlat.or maximizing social welfare by irnposing a qnalit.y standard s9w. The welfare measnre we nse is a simple addition nf consnmer and prndncer snrplns. Fnrthermore we inchtde a term captatrirrq possible externalit.ics fuel economy generates on motor vehicle enussions.
The c~onsnmer sttrphts CS boils down to i~z CS -t~f Bs -( 1 -2rys) -2~( rys -x)~dz.
0
Thc first term is thc gross snrphts eac~h constmier enjoys from purchasin~one nnit of the good. The second c~omponent. measures the consnmers' ntility derived from Gnality s. The last two t.erms are t.he pric~e~~nstomers pay and thc average t'tOne might also be interested in the case of semi-collusion whcre the dnopolisos coordinate their quality decision but compete in prices (RScD carTel). Howe~-er. since aggregate demand is constaut and yuality an aggressive variable no qualitp will be províderl in equilibrimn. The intuition is that, apart from costs, the cartel members only care ahout the impact of quality on own aud ri~~al's prices. Since price compet,ition becomes tougher Eor non negativP } firms arc hetter off if s-0(see, Degr}~se and Irmen (1997) where TR denotes aggre~ate transportation costs.
?3 nsod iu prat~titr is to in~ipose excise taxc~rlesigned to int~rea.tie 6u~1 prit~cs. TLc idea is to have fix~l prit.es reHect the`trne~~ost of fnel nse.' [n our model. rhis polic.y int~re:rses B sinc~e a higlier fitel price angments r'onsumers' savings dne to a bt~trer g:GS mileage Accordingly, firms provide a ltigher qnality sn". Hou.e~.c~r, the gap betu.cen s'~" and s"`widens.t'
Concluding Remarks
The dist~ttssion aboitt t.he inceritives to provide fttel~~fficicnt t~ars is likely to remain intt~usc~sint~e real fnel prit~eti are high and en~~ironmental cait~ern grou~in~;. Oitr px}ier pr~itrts to an argnment that, among otlters, helps to explain tlte mint~t~tnt attititclt~of t}tt~~ar indttst,ry to sttpPly the market. u-ith t-hc F)JC:.
Ve iutderstand the pro~-ision of a part,ictilar prochx t attrihnt.e ,tws part of a unilti-ditnensional decision problem. TLe restiltinK eqnilibritun set of at.taibntes rcfíc~ts demaucl arnl strategit~t~onsiderations. Fnrtítcrmore, wo ar~nt~tLat firtns mrry f~tcc~a rottstraiuctl }irotlnt~t spat~c antl sltou-tltat a tt~t~}tunlogit~al t~untitraittt m~ty itrtply disitx~enri~es to pro~-ide t}nality.
Our resnlts }uglilight that the shapes of c~ars bet~otne more similar rtiircl~terotly-namir~as t~onsitmers' marginal u-illitigtress to pay for a better gas tnilcage increases. xObserve that the firms' strategy spaces are such that "leapfrogging", i.e., deviations for which A 1 B' -1-rys"`, is excluded.
